Foremost in
essay was the view (reiterated by Zahavi 1993a) that Darwin's emphasis on sexual selection was misplaced in not properly directing attention towards extravagance and cost: for one thing, extravagance is not confined to sexual selection. Zahavi (1991) concluded: 'I agree with Darwin that two distinct selection processes exist in nature, but I suggest that these are ''natural selection'' and ''signal selection''.' Later Zahavi (1993b) emphasized that both his and Darwin's interpretations 'suggest that there are two distinct and opposing processes in evolution'.
The sexual and natural selection dichotomy has been useful, and remains so (in a most informal way); but it should not be overstated. One can see potential mates simply as one kind of agent (along with food resources, shelter, predators, etc.) that acts in gene selection. In this view, Darwin's selection dichotomy seems forced. As Cronin (1991) stated: 'In modern Darwinism, Darwin's contrasts between sexual selection's extravagance, its trade-offs, its harmfulness, and natural selection's utility, its efficiency, its benefits all melt away. All adaptations are compromises; a tradeoff between mating and predation is no different in principle from a trade-off between foraging and predation'. It may well be that the separation of sexual selection from natural selection (this apparent depreciation of natural selection) contributed greatly to Wallace's disaffection with Darwin's notion of sexual selection (1870, 1878) .
I feel that in maintaining a distinction between natural selection and signal selection, Zahavi (1991) is also making a mistake. Having described signal selection as the selection for 'waste', he indicated that a signal must have a cost to be reliable as an indicator of quality: the higher the investment, the greater the reliability. This much was a familiar description of the handicap theory (Zahavi 1975 (Zahavi , 1977 ; more specifically, this is the 'strategic handicap' interpretation: see Johnstone 1995). But Zahavi (1991) further argued: 'In this respect the evolution of signals differs fundamentally from the logic by which all other characters are selected. All other characters are selected for efficiency; the smaller the investment required to achieve a particular result the better' (my italics).
This depiction of the theory is wrong. An important feature of Zahavi's handicap theory is that it shows that signals are theoretically similar to other adaptive characters regarding efficiency, in that they entail costs and produce benefits, and there must be a net benefit for them to be selected. Zahavi (1991) was, of course, right that the concept of 'cost' is fundamental to his principle (Grafen 1990) , and that it helps to distinguish his handicap principle from other theories of ornamentation (see also Johnstone & Grafen 1993; Yachi 1995) . (For a different angle, consult Maynard Smith's (1994) modelling of reliable signals that are not costly.) But this does not mean that a handicap's costliness distinguishes it from other traits. Rather, it is, as Zahavi (1991) indicated, the need for the 'costliness' that appears to be unique. This tells us how the handicap works: that there is a trade-off, and why it exists. But in nature trade-offs are the norm not the exception, and they exist for numerous reasons. Most traits can be expected to have some cost.
There is an inconsistency in Zahavi's (1991) reference to 'cost' in handicap signalling. One can have little objection to the word 'wasteful' as a scientific label pointing to the need for a signal to be costly for it to be effective, but Zahavi (1991) goes beyond this matter of semantics to imply: (1) that signal selection involves selection
